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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's approach to incorporation left a troubled legacy
for criminal procedure. Nearly a century after the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified the Court imposed most of the relevant Bill of
Rights guarantees on the states in a piecemeal manner. In doing so, it
failed to articulate a coherent principle for identifying the boundaries of
the rights at stake, aside from an unwieldy compromise between
fundamental fairness and the balancing of interests. This approach
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I would like
to thank Don Dripps for inviting me to comment on his paper and the other conference
participants for their stimulating research and discussion.
produced a jurisprudence of prophylaxis and exceptions-a policy-
driven, Swiss cheese re-fashioning of rights that has left more holes than
cheese in such critical areas as search and seizure, police interrogation,
and the right to counsel. Would total incorporation have offered a clearer
and more legitimate path? As a historical matter, there is little evidence
that the concept of a nationalized Bill of Rights made any mark on state
criminal procedure in the nineteenth century or that more than a handful
of commentators expected the Fourteenth Amendment have such an
effect.
The fascinating papers presented at this conference establish three
things. First, scholars who approach the incorporation debate from an
originalist perspective have taken important strides toward unearthing
the rich, historical context of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if they if
have not convinced everyone that history trumps judicial construction.
Second, at least two framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative
Bingham and Senator Howard, believed that it imposed the Bill of
Rights on the states. Third, sparse discussion of the topic in the years
surrounding ratification reflected diverse levels of awareness of and
support for the concept of nationalizing the Bill. There is a lot of silence
and not much total incorporation talk in the historical record from the
1860s and 1870s, and both scholarly camps have to admit that a few
nineteenth-century commentators said things that undermine their
position. Resolving this aspect of the debate boils down to deciding
whose understanding can serve as a proxy for the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment-the drafters, the ratifiers, a few eminent treatise
writers, the press, or the general public who read the newspapers that
George Thomas has painstakingly searched for clues.1
What the conference papers do not establish is that most nineteenth-
century experts on criminal procedure believed the states would be
forced to abandon their own approaches to investigating and prosecuting
suspects in favor of a national model. Nor do they establish that the
Fourteenth Amendment altered the actual practices of police officers,
lawyers, or judges in ordinary criminal cases for decades after its adoption.
Rather, as Donald Dripps argues, at the time of ratification some states
were engaged in an independent process of reforming criminal procedure
and at least two of their projects conflicted with Bill of Rights
provisions. 2 In the final analysis, however, this Commentary contends
1. See generally George C. Thomas 1II, Newspapers and the Fourteenth Amendment:
What did the American Public Know about Section 1?, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
323 (2009).
2. Donald A. Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and the
(First) Criminal Procedure Revolution, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 469, 470 (2009)
(hereinafter Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment).
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that neither the rationalism of Jeremy Bentham nor the Bill of Rights
guarantees, as they were understood in the nineteenth century, adequately
facilitated truth-finding or protected criminal suspects from abuse.
II. THE "FIRST CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION" AND
THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
During the nineteenth century, Benthamite ideas led reformers away
from the common-law system which was "presupposed by the Bill of
Rights."4 Professor Dripps calls the changes they wrought the "first
revolution" in criminal procedure.5 The centerpieces of his narrative are
the replacement of grand jury procedure with prosecution by
information and the abolition of defendants' incapacity to testify-
reforms that conflicted with the Fifth Amendment. However, these
two reforms did not constitute the entire revolution to which Professor
Dripps refers. In fact, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted during a
period of momentous transition in American criminal justice. This
revolution, which began before the Civil War and continued after the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, produced such major
institutional changes as the rise of professional police forces, defense
lawyers, and public prosecutors' offices, which in turn rendered certain
aspects of the existing doctrine anachronistic and obstructive.6 The
grand jury requirement and the rule against defendant testimony
constituted points of incompatibility between state criminal procedure
reform and the Bill of Rights. Professor Dripps seems to find these two
3. See infra notes 7-10, 28-37 and accompanying text.
4. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 2, at 474.
5. Id. at 470.
6. See id. at 474-76. See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003) (analyzing factors leading to the
predominance of plea bargaining over jury trials by the late nineteenth century); JOHN
LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (2003) (describing the origins
and impact of the transition from the lawyerless criminal trial to a system dominated by
attorneys and adversary procedure); WILBUR R. MILLER, COPS AND BOBBIES: POLICE
AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK AND LONDON, 1830-1870 (1973) (charting the rise of organized,
public police forces); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1989) (documenting the slow evolution toward a system of public prosecution); Carolyn
B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of Public Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309 (2002) (hereinafter Ramsey, The Discretionary Power)
(assessing the nature of the prosecutor's public role in the early days of fully-staffed
District Attorney's offices in the nineteenth century).
aspects of the old system objectionable, as did a growing number of
nineteenth-century state legislators.
Michael Kent Curtis' call for a broader historical context also implicates
other criminal procedure matters, including search and seizure, in the
controversy over original meaning. Professor Curtis describes the trampling
of rights, particularly those of free speech and assembly, in the antebellum
South and suggests that the bitter experiences of the abolitionists, many
of whom were prominent Republicans, produced a constitutional theory
demanding that states respect the Bill of Rights.7 This unfortunate
history was not limited to the suppression of speech. Indeed, agents of
the slave states unjustifiably detained both blacks and whites; seized
property, including abolitionist literature; and interrogated suspects to
preserve their race-based hierarchy in the face of dissent.8 These tactics
continued after the Civil War as the defeated South tried to cling to
white supremacy.
The Fourteenth Amendment framers commented on such abuses. In a
congressional speech in 1866, for example, Bingham alluded to South
Carolina's banishment of Massachusetts activist Samuel Hoar, who was
ridden out of Charleston on a rail for challenging the arrest of black
sailors. 9 Yet, while Southern practices undeniably offended criminal
procedure provisions in the Bill of Rights, the historical evidence does
not establish that the Fourteenth Amendment was widely expected to
end these oppressive practices by incorporating the Bill in toto. Bruce
Smith notes that Bingham's allusion to the Hoar incident in a
congressional speech "is not the same as claiming that protections
against illegal 'search and seizure' constituted the 'core' of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 0
Moreover, even if Bingham espoused a total incorporationist position
(and it seems clear that he did), few charged with interpreting or
enforcing the criminal law, outside the context of combating Southern
political terrorism, seem to have shared his views. In the 1870s, federal
7. Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States: An Overview from One
Perspective, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISsUES 3, 19-33 (2009) (hereinafter Curtis, The Bill
of Rights and the States).
8. See ANDREW TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY
OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789-1868 94, 106-11, 227, 246 (2006). See generally SALLY
E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE COLONIES (2001)
(describing the enforcement of slave laws and the influence of the slave system and
white conceptions of honor on the formation of Southern police forces). See also Curtis,
The Bill of Rights and the States, supra note 7, at 19-20.
9. See TASLITZ, supra note 8, at 246.
10. Bruce P. Smith, The Fourth Amendment, 1789-1868: A Strange History, 5
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 663, 669 (2008) (reviewing TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FoURTH
AMENDMENT, supra note 8).
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prosecutors successfully used Reconstruction enforcement statutes to
target civil rights violations by Ku Klux Klansmen."1 However, despite
their criticism of Southern atrocities, reformers in the North, the
Northwest, and the West failed to see a connection between the evils of
the slave system and the Klan's reign of terror, on the one hand, and the
abusive detention and interrogation practices of their own police forces,
on the other. 12 To the extent that they analyzed the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment, especially in light of Barron v. Baltimore,
1 3
they probably did not think it threatened the autonomy of their state
criminal justice systems. Of course, the perceptions of people other than
framers or ratifiers may be extraneous to an "original meaning" analysis.
But under the New Originalism, 14 the views of a broader spectrum of
individuals comprise the general public understanding.
Professor Dripps makes a credible case against total incorporation
under both brands of originalism, though he leans heavily on reformist
moves in criminal procedure in just a handful of states. Citing the work
of such reformers as Alexander Buel, who spearheaded the repudiation
of the grand jury in Michigan in 1859,15 as well as legal treatises and
judicial opinions, Professor Dripps demonstrates the existence of support
both before and after the Civil War for state innovations that did not
comport with the federal Bill of Rights. In 1868, several states had
already ceased to require traditional grand jury proceedings, and over the
next decade four more followed suit. Modern incorporationists offer
little convincing evidence that reformers who favored the abolition of
the grand jury requirement thought ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment
would frustrate their project. Indeed, Bryan Wildenthal concedes that,
with the exception of John Pomeroy,' 6 all of the jurists whom Professor
Dripps mentions either explicitly asserted state power to depart
from the Fifth Amendment or assumed the Fourteenth "would have
11. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of
Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 920-22 (1986).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 33-36 (discussing interrogation and witness
detention practices in New York, Illinois and California).
13. 32 U.S. 243, 247-50 (1833).
14. See Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment:
Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 361, 364-65 (2009) (explaining the New Originalism).
15. Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 2, at 479-80.
16. Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and
Commentary on the Fourth Amendment in 1867-73, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 153,
191-229 (2009).
little or no effect on criminal procedure." 17 Many of these jurists held
Republican loyalties, which makes their assumption that ratification was
compatible with Benthamite reforms damaging to the total incorporation
thesis.
Even Senator Howard omitted explicit reference to the grand jury
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment in his May 1866 speech about the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth. According to Professor
Dripps, this shows that Howard was a "selective," rather than a "total"
incorporationist. 18 The counter-argument that Howard simply provided
a non-exhaustive set of examples1 seems more probable, but it does not
definitively answer the question of how contemporaries perceived Howard's
words. This May 1866 speech constituted one of the most particularized
discussions of the rights that would be protected, yet it gave Republican
grand jury opponents hazy notice of tension between their criminal
procedure agenda and ratification.
The view that Republicans simply chose ratification over their more
trivial objective of abolishing the grand jury20 makes sense. However, I
have not seen much evidence that anyone except Representative Bingham
and legal scholars George Paschal, Timothy Farrar, and possibly Pomeroy
would have envisioned a conflict between the two. Moreover, because
grand jury opponents commanded a political majority in Kansas at the time
of ratification,21 we can presume that some ratifiers were also reformers.
Thus, Professor Dripps' argument remains plausible, even if the views of
those who framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment are the only
ones that count toward the Amendment's original meaning.
Professor Wildenthal's evidence that the majority of states retained a
grand jury right in 186822 only indicates a lack of conflict between their
practice and the Bill of Rights; it does not prove that most ratifiers
believed the Fourteenth Amendment would require states with differing
procedures to abandon them. Moreover, if events after ratification can
17. Wildenthal, supra note 16, at 189. Professor Dripps does not discuss the
writings of either George W. Paschal or Barron-contrarian Timothy Farrar, both of
whom asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed the Bill of Rights on the states.
See id. at 229-39. See also infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
18. Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: "Here
I Go Down that Wrong RoadAgain ", 74 N.C. L. REv. 1559, 1583 (1996).
19. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1 11 (1986).
20. See Richard L. Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the States: The
History and the Future, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 77, 134-38 (2009).
21. See Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 2, at 484. Kansas ratified
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867 and eliminated the grand jury requirement in 1868.
22. Wildenthal, supra note 16, at 213.
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be taken into account,23 the authorization of prosecution by information
in four more states-Illinois, Wisconsin, Colorado, and California-in
the 1870s further undercuts the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment
was thought to accomplish total incorporation.24
The privilege against self-incrimination constituted another piece of
territory staked out by Benthamite reformers. Both proponents and
detractors of removing defendants' testimonial disqualification linked
this move to the abrogation of the privilege. Yet those who objected to
allowing defense testimony apparently eschewed the argument that the
Fifth Amendment, applied through the Fourteenth, would bar sworn
defendant testimony or more importantly, adverse comment on failure to
testify, in state trials. 25 This offers some additional evidence that they
did not think Section 1 accomplished total incorporation.
The testimonial-incapacity issue provides a less compelling argument
against the historical basis of incorporation than prosecution by information
does, however, because testimonial incapacity implicated the scope of
the privilege against self-incrimination, rather than the question of
whether states could jettison it completely.26 Nevertheless, taken together,
the state criminal procedure reforms constitute a puzzle that incorporationists
have neither solved nor persuasively dismissed. Proponents of either
brand of originalism should admit that Professor Dripps makes a
reasonable case against total incorporation. And if subsequent judicial
rulings can inform the analysis, the fact that Fourteenth Amendment
challenges to prosecution by information and issues related to defendant
testimony failed miserably in the courts before the nineteenth century's
end 27 further strengthens his argument.
23. But see id. at 158-60 (arguing that post-ratification evidence and especially
any views expressed after 1877, the year that signaled the end of the Reconstruction,
should be given less weight in establishing the original understanding); see also Aynes,
supra note 20, at 100 (emphasizing the need for caution in assessing post-ratification events
due to the reactionary movement that followed the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption).
24. See Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 2, at 484.
25. See id. at 492-93.
26. Most state constitutions contained the privilege, see Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 83, 114 (1908), though it was not generally thought to apply to the police
station or to implicate the prophylactic requirements that we associate with it today.
27. See Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 2, at 490-91, 494-95.
III. LEGAL HISTORY, SUSPECTS' RIGHTS, AND THE REFORM OF
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A normative critique is unnecessary to undercut the historical basis of
total incorporation; indeed, it may be inappropriate in an originalist
analysis. But since our panel bears the title "Frontiers of Incorporation,"
perhaps we can legitimately indulge in a little normativity. For Professor
Dripps, getting beyond incorporation seems to be just a starting point for
remedying the ills of modem criminal procedure. In Bentham's view
(and apparently in Professor Dripps' opinion, as well), a rational legal
system must evolve by discarding anachronisms and impediments to
truth-finding. Professor Dripps subscribes to the nineteenth-century
reformers' allegations that secret grand jurysproceedings lead not only to
expense and inefficiency, but also to abuse.2  During the Reconstruction,
grand juries often refused to indict Ku Klux Klan members for
lynching;29 conversely, they are criticized today for rubber-stamping the
charging decisions of overzealous prosecutors.30
The critique of the privilege against self-incrimination proves more
difficult to embrace. I believe that this position can only be sustained by
creating an interrogation environment free from abusive police
techniques that risk generating false confessions. Eschewing total
incorporation permits state innovation, which does not yield positive
results unless the innovation is sound. Professor Dripps has elsewhere
described a model of instrumental procedural due process that allows
recording, the presence of counsel, time limits, and even the defendant's
silence with the caveat that adverse inferences may be drawn from it.
31
This proposal has some validity in the twenty-first century. However, in
the second half of the nineteenth century, the conditions necessary to
permit just experimentation with Bentham's theory of confessions were
sorely lacking. 2 A retreat from total incorporation in favor of due process
looks undesirable if we get stuck with nineteenth-century notions of due
process.
28. Id. at 498-99.
29. See I GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.5, at 1-23 (Sara Sun Beale et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1997) (1986); Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is there Room
for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2002).
30. See Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2333, 2335-36 & n.4 (2008) (collecting citations to scholars who have alleged that "the
average grand jury would indict 'a ham sandwich').
31. DONALD DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINs, DEVELOPMENT,
AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 147-48 (2003).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 33-37 (discussing the brutality and corruption
of nineteenth-century police and the lax scrutiny of their conduct by the judiciary).
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Professor Dripps treats the nineteenth-century transformation of criminal
justice as a narrative of progress; yet describing the doctrinal revolution
in criminal procedure only tells part of the story. The nineteenth-century
police were notoriously brutal, and other 3ersonnel in the system often
acted on corrupt, self-interested motives. Police and judges who had
power over the fate of individual defendants seem to have become less
respectful of defendants' silence as the nineteenth century progressed.
Evidence rules aimed at insuring reliability governed the admissibility of
confessions. Hence, historically, courts had excluded confessions considered
to be the product of threats or inducements. However, Wesley Oliver's
study of criminal procedure in New York demonstrates that elected state
judges treated deceitful, coercive police tactics more permissively in the
second half of the nineteenth century after the confession rule was
relaxed, and that, for this reason, officers abandoned an earlier practice
of giving suspects warnings, including a warning about their right to
silence.3
My own research further illuminates how actual practice negated the
privilege against self-incrimination. In Illinois, California, and New York
(and probably in many other states as well) in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, officers worked up cases against so-called
"witnesses" held without probable cause or a formal charge. 35 Efforts to
bring state witncss detention policies into line with federal statutory law
did little to curb the common police tactic of "sweating" witnesses to
force them to incriminate themselves or others-a tactic that sometimes
led to false confessions and erroneous charges.36 Incommunicado
questioning and the decline of warnings were only indirectly relevant to
the nineteenth-century privilege, which did not clearly extend to the pre-
trial setting even in federal cases prior to Brain v. United States.37 But
they add another dimension to Professor Dripps' argument about
33. See, e.g, Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control,
1880-1920, 77 U. COLO. L. REV 101, 168-71 (2006) (basing discussion of this situation
in nineteenth-century New York City on archival history research).
34. Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Magistrates' Examinations, Police Interrogations
and Miranda-like Warnings in Nineteenth Century New York, 81 TUL. L. REV. 777, 780-
81, 810-21 (2007).
35. Carolyn B. Ramsey, In the Sweat Box: A Historical Perspective on the
Detention of Material Witnesses, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L.681, 686-89, 695-700 ( 2009).
36. See id. at 691-92 (discussing an 1874 Illinois statute) and 686-89, 699-700
(describing pressures leading detained witnesses to give false or inaccurate statements).
37. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
reformers' increased impatience with defendants' silence, and they
illustrate my point about the dangers of Bentham's views in a society in
which police interrogation was virtually lawless. Rejection of the
incorporationist position leaves a choice between nineteenth-century due
process and modem innovation. Even a cursory glance at the history of
criminal procedure suggests the superiority of the latter.
Should the incorporation debate matter to criminal procedure
scholars? Yale Kamisar posits a system in which judges decide cases
according to their own values and invent doctrine retrospectively to
justify their decisions.38 I accept this as a description of the current state
of the law, but I cannot embrace it normatively as an appropriate path for
even the most well-meaning judge. Supreme Court decision-making
without a guiding principle to anchor doctrine has created the mess that
now afflicts constitutional criminal procedure. That said, I do not share
the incorporationists' confidence that simply announcing a unitary set of
national rights would have solved the problem.
Total incorporation might have established more definite parameters
than the selective approach the Court took, but the Court ultimately could
not escape vexing interpretation questions surrounding each guarantee.
Even if the states had clearly adverted to being bound by the entire Bill
of Rights at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification (which
I do not think they did), meaningful protection of criminal suspects
awaited clarification of the scope and content of those rights. Given
popular demands for vigorous crime control,39 the unchecked spread of
abusive police practices, and the appeal to nineteenth-century legal elites
of Benthamite attacks on the privilege against self-incrimination, 41 a
narrow version of criminal procedure rights would have been adopted if
nineteenth-century leaders had agreed that these clauses of the federal
Bill bound the states. Hence, while I remain skeptical of the ability of
Benthamite rationalism to yield reliable outcomes punishing the guilty
and protecting the innocent in individual cases, I also cannot see Bingham's
nationalization project as a panacea. Whether one chooses the
incorporationist or anti-incorporationist position, strict reliance on
38. Yale Kamisar, How Much Does It Really Matter Whether the Court Works
within the "Clearly Marked" Provisions of the Bill of Rights or with the Generalities of
the Fourteenth Amendment?, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 513, 521-22 (using the
Miranda v. Arizona opinion as an example).
39. See Ramsey, The Discretionary Power, supra note 6, at 1310-17, 1336-38,
1342-52 (showing that the late nineteenth-century public urged prosecutors to pursue the
most severe charges possible, rather than to play a neutral, quasi-judicial role).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
41. See Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 2, at 491-94.
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historical evidence in defining rights results in an approach to criminal
procedure that guarantees neither truth nor fairness.
512
